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ABSTRACT

This paper surveys obstacles to disarmament in the Soviet Union, with emphasis on the role of the military tradition in Russia and the centrality of the defense sector to Soviet society. The hypothesis is that, although the role of militarism is strong, there are potential forces for demilitarization, including, for example, the friction caused by declining economic growth and an increased military burden. The vision of a socialist society held by the founders of Marxism and the makers of the Bolshevik revolution was decidedly anti-militaristic. Nevertheless, the USSR is currently one of the two most highly militarized nations in the world. The Soviet Union has amassed military power roughly comparable to that of the United States, even though its Gross National Product is only about half as large. Consequently, a higher rate of extraction of resources has been necessary, with tremendous economic, social, and political consequences. Many reasons are given to explain this military build-up, including that the military effort has been forced on the Soviet Union through the enmity of the capitalist world and that the present generation of Soviet leaders sees military power as the main guarantee of Soviet security and leadership. In spite of this military stance, however, there are developments in the Soviet Union today which suggest that a change of direction is possible. For example, the arms competition with the United States has become an important focus of dissident criticism, and Russia's destiny and the proper path of Soviet development have become topics of vigorous debate within the Soviet Union and abroad. In addition, the next generation in the Soviet Union has not been so deeply marked by war and may view military power in a different light. The conclusion is that Western governments should not foreclose, through their own policies, the possibility of Soviet moves toward disarmament and demilitarization. (Author/DB)

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War, Militarism and the Soviet State

DAVID HOLLOWAY

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This paper is one in a series of working papers commissioned by the World Order Models Project in its effort to stimulate research, education, dialogue, and political action which will contribute to a movement for a just world order. The papers will deal with major global problems facing humanity, and particularly vexing contemporary political, economic, social, and cultural issues within an analytic and normative framework guided by the concepts and values of peace, economic well-being, social justice, and ecological stability. Special emphasis will be given to the necessity and feasibility of structural transformation of today's fragmented world in order to resolve these problems and achieve just world order results.

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WAR, MILITARISM AND THE SOVIET STATE*

David HOLLOWAY†

This paper surveys the obstacles to disarmament in the Soviet Union, and analyses both internal and external factors of Soviet militarism, the role of Russian political/military tradition, and the centrality of the defense sector to Soviet society. Although the sources of militarism are strong, the author argues that they are not absolute, and that there is scope for demilitarization initiatives. Most of the demilitarizing tendencies will come from internal influences and the working out of internal contradictions, such as that between declining economic growth and an increased military burden. Nevertheless, the West should not foreclose through their own policies the possibility of Soviet moves toward disarmament.

Within the world's military structure, the Soviet Union and the United States stand in a class by themselves. They mount the two largest military efforts, and between them they account for one-half of the massive resources which the world devotes to arms and armed forces. There are, it is true, considerable differences between the military forces of the Soviet Union and those of the United States, but these are insignificant when compared with the differences between their combined forces and the forces of other states.

Judging from the armed forces it maintains and the weapons it produces, it is clear that the Soviet military effort is large. It is difficult, however, to say precisely what resources it consumes. The Soviet government publishes a figure for the defense budget each year, but this is of little help in estimating the military burden because it is not clear what the budget covers. In any event, observers outside the Soviet Union agree that the Soviet Armed Forces could not be paid for by the official defense budget without the help

*I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments received on an earlier draft from Silviu Brucan, Judith Reppy and William Sweet.

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of very large hidden subsidies. Western attempts to assess Soviet defense spending must be treated with caution too because of the intrinsic difficulties of making such estimates.[1] It is evident, nevertheless, that only a major commitment of resources has enabled the Soviet Union in the last twenty years to attain strategic parity with the United States, maintain large well-equipped forces in Europe and along the frontier with China, extend the deployment of the Soviet Navy throughout the world, and engage in continuous modernization of arms and equipment.

A military effort of this scale necessarily has a far-reaching impact on the Soviet economy. An extensive network of military research and development establishments is required to develop armaments, while a major sector of industry is needed to produce them in quantity. The Soviet Union has amassed military power roughly comparable to that of the United States, even though its Gross National Product is only about half as large. Consequently, a higher rate of extraction of resources has been necessary, with consequences which will be examined below.

The maintenance of standing forces of some four million people (mainly men) has not only economic, but also social and political consequences.[2] Institutional arrangements exist to draft a substantial proportion of each generation of young men into the Armed Forces. A considerable effort is

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[1]The figures available on arms production and force levels give only the roughest indication of Soviet military production. They show no very sharp fluctuations since 1950, but they are too crude to register any but the most massive changes. The late 1950s and early 1960s appear to be the period of lowest effort. Western estimates of Soviet defense spending as a proportion of GNP seem to fit this pattern, with the Khrushchev years as the period when the proportion was lowest. Most estimates, derived by whatever means, fall into the range of 8 to 14 per cent, with the lower estimates for the late 1950s and early 1960s. See, for example, the following:
A.S. Becker, *Soviet National Income* 1958-64, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, ch.7; F.D. Holzman, *Financial Checks on Soviet Defense Expenditures*, Lexington, Mass., Toronto and London, 1975; H. Block, in Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, Washington D.C., 1973, pp. 175–204; W.T. Lee, *The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures* 1955–75, New York, 1977.
Assessment of the burden in terms of the proportion of GNP devoted to defense may not tell the whole story. An argument can be made that for an economy at a lower level of development – and in particular for one striving to catch up with more advanced economies – the same proportion of GNP is a heavier burden than for a highly developed economy because the competing ends to which resources could be devoted are more pressing.

[2]*The Military Balance*, IISS, London, each year gives a figure for the manpower in the Soviet Armed Forces. In 1979 that figure is 3.6 million. (*The Military Balance* 1979–80, p.9). This does not include approximately 400 000 KGB and MVD troops. On top of these figures there are the 100 000 troops who engage in construction, railroad, farm and medical work. See M. Feshbach and S. Rapawy, in Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, Washington D.C., 1976, pp. 144–52.

made to ensure that reserves are available for mobilization if necessary. Voluntary military societies provide moral support for the Armed Forces and military training for the population at large. Secondary-school children are given pre-induction military training from the age of fifteen. In recent years there has been a growing campaign of military-patriotic education which tries to instill in the population the values of patriotism and respect for military virtues. Party leaders seemingly believe that obligatory military service can help to foster social discipline and to bring the different nationalities closer together. They also appear to believe that association of the Party with the Armed Forces will strengthen Soviet patriotism and the commitment of the people to the existing political order.[3] At the highest political level the close relationship between Party and Army has been underlined by the awarding to General Secretary Brezhnev of various military honours, including the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.

All this is a far cry from the vision of socialist society which the founders of Marxism and the makers of the Bolshevik revolution held. Marxist thought has traditionally been marked by an antipathy to militarism, seeing, as it does, war and armies as the product of the world capitalist system. Before 1917 socialists agreed that standing armies were instruments of aggression abroad and repression at home; the proper form of military organization for a socialist state would be the citizen army which would not degenerate into a military caste or create a military realm separate from other areas of social life. Although he had to lead the young Soviet republic against the White armies and foreign intervention, Lenin never succumbed to the worship of things military nor did he try to enhance his own authority through the instruments of military command.

Why is it then that the country in which the first socialist revolution took place is so highly militarized? Why is Soviet military organization so different from original socialist concepts, with rank and hierarchy so markedly distinguished? Why is the defense sector accorded a special place in the economy? Why are the values of military patriotism given so much emphasis? The object of this paper is to examine the obstacles to disarmament and demilitarization in the Soviet Union and to see whether there exists in Soviet society the possibility for initiatives in that direction. In order to do this the internal causes of arms policies and militarization must be examined in the attempt to answer the questions raised here.

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[3]Defense Minister Ustinov has declared that "service in the Soviet Armed Forces is a wonderful school of labor and martial training, of moral purity and courage, of patriotism and comradeship" (*Pravda*, 8 November 1979, p. 2). See T. Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Soviet Army as the Instrument of National Integration", in John Erickson and E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.) *Soviet Military Power and Performance*, London, 1979, pp. 129–54.

Methodological issues

Soviet writers claim that there is nothing intrinsic in Soviet society that would generate arms production or armed forces, and that the military effort has been forced on the Soviet Union through the enmity of the capitalist world. This claim is not usually argued at length, and is based on a general statement about the nature of socialism rather than on a specific analysis of the Soviet system. A contrast is drawn with the fundamentally aggressive nature of imperialism and the incentives which the capitalist system offers for arms production. In this view Soviet military policy is purely a response to external stimuli. (Interestingly, the same writers often claim that Soviet society is, for various reasons, peculiarly suited to building up military power; among the reasons given are the disciplined, hierarchical, military-like organization of the Party, and the planned economy which enables the Party to mobilize resources for military purposes.)[4]

A rather different view is given by those peace researchers who argue that the East–West arms race is now firmly rooted in the domestic structures of the two military superpowers. The military competition between East and West, it is claimed, did have its origins in international conflict, but has now become institutionalized in powerful military–industrial–scientific complexes. This is why the settlement of major political disputes in Europe in the early 1970s was not accompanied by any significant moves toward demilitarization. This argument points not to specific features of socialism or Russian history, but to characteristics which the Soviet Union shares with the United States.[5]

The Soviet Union has been subjected to this kind of critical analysis primarily since its emergence as a fully-fledged military superpower. The attainment of strategic parity with the United States has made the Soviet Union seem to share full responsibility for the continuing arms race. Soviet arms policies in the 1970s have proved profoundly disappointing to those who hoped that the SALT I agreements would lead to a slackening of the arms race. They, and others, have come more insistently to ask: what drives Soviet arms policies? What are the domestic roots of those policies?

The problem of militarization is, however, wider than that of disarmament. Andreski has pointed out that the term militarism is used in a number of different senses : first, to describe an aggressive foreign policy, based on a readiness to resort to war; second, to describe the preponderance of the military in the state, the extreme case being that of military rule; third, to characterize the subservience of the whole society to the needs of the army,

[4]See, for example, *Markizm–Leninizm o voine i armii*, Moscow, 1968, ch. 5.
[5]See, in particular, Dieter Senghaas, *Rustung and Militorismus*, Frankfurt am Main, 1972.

which may involve a recasting of social life in accordance with the pattern of military organization; and fourth, to define an ideology which propagates military ideals.[6] In this paper I shall use the term militarization to refer to the third of these phenomena, specifying the others when necessary. Andreski defines militarism as a compound of these elements, although it remains an interesting question whether they are necessarily related to one another.

In an essay on the militarization of Soviet education, William Odom argues that Soviet militarism is to be explained by two major factors.[7] The first of these is the similarity that exists between socialism and the war system. By this he means that both socialism and a state at war "sacrifice individuals and their private interests for the state's political objectives."[8] (This is akin to the argument made by Soviet writers who point to the capacity of the Soviet system for creating powerful armed forces.) The Second factor is the inheritance by the Soviet state of the military–political tradition of Tsarism. The very process of consolidating Soviet power against external and internal enemies meant that the Bolshevik state "had to accept as its birthright most of the tensions that had made militarization of the old state seem imperative to the imperial leadership."[9] The argument here is not that socialism is inevitably militarist, but that the Imperial military tradition had combined with the Soviet experience to create a form of socialist militarism. In other words, Odom sees the militarization of Soviet society as primarily a product of Russian history and the Soviet system. This is an important argument, but it needs to be supplemented by an analysis which relates present militarizing tendencies to current developments in the Soviet Union, and not merely to an inherited tradition.

There are, of course, many who see the militarization of Soviet society as a consequence of both external and internal factors and explain it in terms of the Cold War rather than of the Russian past. Many socialists and liberals in the West, for example, held the view – particularly in the early

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[6] J. Gould, W.L. Kolb (eds.) *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*, London, 1964, pp. 429–30.
[7] William E. Odom, 'The "Militarization" of Soviet Society', *Problems of Communism* 1976 no. 5, pp. 34–51.
[8] *Loc. cit.* p. 51. In a lecture given in 1906 Otto Hintze made a similar point. Writing of Germany, he said : "militarism still pervades our political system and public life today, generally in a very decisive way. Even Social Democracy, which is in principle against everything connected with militarism, not only owes to it the discipline on which its party organization largely rests, but also in its ideal for the future it has unconsciously adopted a good measure of the coercion of the individual by the community, which comes from the Prussian military state". Otto Hintze, 'Military Organization and State Organization', in Felix Gilbert (ed.) *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, New York, 1965, p. 211. See also the essay by E. Jahn, 'The Role of the Armaments Complex in Soviet Society', *Journal of Peace Research* 1975, no. 3, pp. 179–194.
[9] ibid.

years of deStalinization – that if the tensions of the Cold War could be relaxed, this would facilitate not only a shift of resources away from military purposes, but also political change in the direction of freedom and democracy. In other words, many of the distortions of Soviet socialism could be explained in terms of the international pressure under which socialist construction has to be carried out in the Soviet Union.

In the mid–1970s E.P. Thompson wrote of the policy of nuclear disarmament and positive neutrality which the New Left advocated in Britain in the late 1950s and the 1960s :

> It was a critical part of our advocacy that with each effective movement of detente there would follow a relaxation in military and bureaucratic pressures within the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus the relaxation of Cold War tensions was a precondition for further deStalinization, and a precondition for resuming socialist and democratic advances, East or West.[10]

Thompson goes on to ask whether Soviet policy in the early 1970s – detente with the West allied with sharper repression of dissidents at home – invalidates this argument. He concludes that it does not, on two grounds: that the detente of the early 1970s amounted only to great power agreement to regulate their interests from above; further, that the repression of dissidents is a sign that even a little detente sharpens internal contradictions in the Soviet Union by threatening to deprive the bureaucracy of its functions and the official ideology of its credibility. Over the long run, he argues, international tension helps to justify repression, while detente will help to weaken that justification and increase the possibilities of movement toward democracy.[11]

It is precisely this kind of argument that has been challenged by those peace researchers who claim that the arms race is so deeply rooted in domestic structures that the lessening of international tension will have no effect on it. Some see the arms race and detente as coexisting for a long time, others see detente as falling victim to tensions generated by the military–industrial complexes. In either case, the peace research argument is that the resolution of international political disputes may be a necessary condition for disarmament and demilitarization, but that it is by no means a sufficient condition.

This is not a comprehensive, much less an exhaustive, survey of the approaches that have been taken in examining the obstacles to disarmament and demilitarization in the Soviet Union. But it does provide some helpful pointers to the relationships that have to be analyzed. The first of these is the interaction of internal and external factors. The particular form which

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[10]E.P. Thompson, 'Detente and Dissent', in Ken Coates (ed.) *Detente and Socialist Democracy*, Nottingham, 1975, p. 123.
[11]ibid., pp. 123–5.

socialist construction has taken in the Soviet Union cannot be understood without reference to the international context in which the Bolsheviks undertook the transformation of Russian society. Consequently the militarization of Soviet society has to be examined in the light of international, as well as of domestic, relationships. Moreover, some attempt must be made to discuss what is specific to militarism in the Soviet Union, and what the USSR shares with militarism elsewhere.

Secondly, it has been seen that different historical perspectives – some rooted in the Russian Empire, some in the Cold War – have been adopted, and this raises interesting questions about the way in which patterns of political relationships are reproduced in a given society. Although it is important to provide a historical perspective, there is the danger that the Russian tradition will be presented as monolithic, and that militarism will be seen as a genetic inheritance, transmitted from one generation (or even one social formation) to the next. This would be disheartening in its implication that no change is possible. It would also be wrong.

The Russian political tradition is diverse, embracing not only militarism, but also the anti-militarism of Tolstoy and Kropotkin. The Soviet tradition too contains various strands, and the diversity is very wide if the views of contemporary dissidents are taken into account. Moreover, the tendency of recent writing on Russian and Soviet history has been to stress not its inevitable, but its contingent character and to point to the openness of choices at critical junctures – between 1905 and 1914, in the 1920s and even in the 1950s, for example. Further, the militarization of Soviet society is a relative, not an absolute, phenomenon – a matter of more or less, not of either/or. Consequently, it would be a mistake to begin this analysis by portraying this militarization as either inevitable or all-embracing.

War and the Soviet state

Analyzing the militarization of Soviet society involves much more than an effort to identify a military-industrial or military-bureaucratic complex, the elimination of which would remove the internal dynamic of Soviet military policy and leave the rest of the social system untouched. The history of the Soviet state is intimately bound up with war and the preparation for war. This is true both in the classical sense that armed force has established the territorial limits of the state and secured internal rule, and in the sense that war and the preparation for it has profoundly affected the internal structure of the state.

This does not mean that the course of Soviet history is to be explained

only in terms of the international environment, but it does mean that the formation of the Soviet state, and the enterprise of socialist construction, cannot be explained without reference to interstate relations. It is indeed one of the striking features of the history of Tszarist Russia and the Soviet Union that rivalry with other, economically more advanced, states has provided a major stimulus to economic and political change. This was true of Peter the Great's reforms, and of the reforms which followed the Crimean and Russo-Japanese wars; it was a major factor in Soviet industrialization too. One consequence of this pattern has been the evolution of the role of the state as the dominant agency of change; it was through the state that social and economic relationships were altered with the aim of mobilizing resources to increase the power of the state.[12]

When the Bolsheviks seized power, they faced the problem of consolidating their rule in the face of enemies at home and abroad. The early experience of the young Soviet state – civil war, foreign intervention and internal unrest – had a profound impact on Bolshevik ideas about military organization. The early vision of militia-type forces did not survive the realization that the Bolsheviks faced considerable opposition both from inside Soviet society and from foreign powers as well. The military reform of 1924–25 created a mixed system, with the main emphasis on standing forces; the territorial-militia element was retained for economic reasons rather than on grounds of principle. Trotsky's project of combining labor with military training was not implemented. Of more immediate practical importance was the view advanced by Frunze, Trotsky's successor as Commissar of War that, in conditions of economic constraints on defense, every civilian activity ought to be examined for the contribution it could make to military preparedness. By the late 1920s the Red Army did have features which distinguished it from the armies of bourgeois states – its social composition and the commissar system, for example – but it was far from embodying the earlier socialist ideas of military organization.[13]

With the failure of revolution in Europe, the Soviet Union was left largely isolated in a hostile world. This helped to stimulate a great debate about the direction of socialist construction, and in the mid-1920s the idea of building "socialism in one country" began to gain ground in the Bolshevik Party.

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[12]See Alexander Gershenkron's 'Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective', in his book of the same title, New York, Washington, London, 1965, pp. 5-30; for an interesting general discussion of the relationship between modernization and international relations, see Dennis Smith, 'Domination and Containment : An Approach to Modernization', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1978 April, pp. 173-213.

[13]On these early debates see John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command* 1918–1941, London, 1962, pp. 113-213; I.V. Berkhin, *Voennaya reforma v SSSR* (1924–25 *gg*), Moscow, 1958.

This idea, as E.H. Carr has noted, marked the marriage of Marxist revolutionary goals and Russian national destiny.[14] The policy of industrialization which was embarked on toward the end of the decade was the practical offspring of this marriage. In 1931, Stalin, now the dominant leader, who had set his own brutal stamp on the industrialization drive, justified the intensity of the policy by referring to the need to overcome Russia's backwardness and thus prevent other powers from beating her:

> Do you want our Socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its Socialist system of economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said during the October Revolution : "Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries."
>
> We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us.[15]

Although this justification was not explicitly military, it did provide a clear rationale for the development of the defense industry.

Industrialization was made possible by a massive extraction of resources from the population and their investment in heavy industry. A vast and powerful Party-State bureaucracy ensured that resources were forthcoming, enforced the priorities set by the Party leaders, and managed the new industrial economy. The defense sector was given high priority in the allocation of investment funds, scarce materials, able managers and skilled workers. During the 1930s a powerful defense industry was created which produced large quantities of weapons, some of which were of high quality. The Soviet Union had rejected the idea, which was popular in the West at the time, of building a small, highly-mechanized army and sought instead to marry the masses and technology – to create a mass army equipped with the best possible armaments. The territorial-militia element of the Armed Forces was gradually abandoned. Yet for all that had been done, the Winter War of 1939/40 with Finland exposed serious weaknesses in the Red Army, some of which resulted from the great purge which Stalin had inflicted on Soviet society in the late 1930s.

The German invasion of 22 June 1941 took Stalin by surprise, and found the Red Army in a state of unpreparedness. The opening months of the war proved disastrous, with the German forces advancing to the outskirts of Moscow. Only through an enormous effort over the next four years was the Soviet Union able to halt the German advance, turn the tide of war and push the German armies back to Berlin. The degree of industrial mobilization was much greater in the Soviet Union than in the other belligerent

[14] E.H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country*, 1924-1926, vol. 2, Harmondsworth, 1970, p. 59.
[15] J.V. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, 1947, p. 356

states, and Soviet losses of people and material goods were immense. The Soviet name for the war with Germany – the Great Patriotic War – symbolizes the appeal which Stalin made to the Soviet people's patriotism. In contrast to the bitter social and political tensions of the 1920s and 1930s, state and people were largely united in the common effort to defeat the Nazi enemy.[16]

Victory brought the Soviet Union gains of territory and influence which had seemed inconceivable in the early months of the war. But victory also brought political conflicts with the wartime allies, and these soon found their expression in intense military rivalry, which centered on the development of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. By 1947 the Soviet Union had four major military research and development programs under way: nuclear weapons, rockets, radar and jet-engine technology. After Stalin's death the implications of this "military-technical revolution" became more pressing. The existence of nuclear weapons in growing stockpiles raised fundamental questions about the relationship of war to policy, and about the appropriate structure for armed forces in the nuclear age – questions which have dominated Soviet military policy ever since.

Khrushchev now put greater stress on peaceful coexistence between East and West, and set in motion major changes in military doctrine and military institutions. In the late 1950s and early 1960s he tried to devise a new military policy, based on nuclear-armed missiles, that would be militarily and diplomatically effective, while freeing resources for civilian purposes. He even floated the idea of restoring the territorial-militia element in the Armed Forces. But internal opposition, which was strengthened by a succession of international crises (the U-2 incident in 1960, the 1961 Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962) and by the Kennedy Administration's build-up of strategic forces, finally defeated Khrushchev's efforts.[17]

If we can speak of a "Soviet military build-up," then its origins lie in the defeat of Khrushchev's policy.[18] His successors have devoted considerable attention to the all-round strengthening of Soviet military power. A major increase in strategic forces has brought parity with the United States. The Ground Forces have been expanded, in particular along the frontier

[16]This is not to deny that there was opposition to the Soviet state during the war; but the memory of the war is very potent. See, for example, ch. 12 of Hedrick Smith, *The Russians*, London, 1976.

[17]On this period of Khrushchev's rule see especially Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin*, London, 1969.

[18]It is also possible to trace the "Soviet military build-up" to the Central Committee resolution "On the Defense of the Country" in 1929. But the present phase has its roots in the "revolution in military affairs" which was the subject of much discussion in the early 1960s.

with China, and have received more modern equipment. The Air Forces too have been modernized. Soviet naval presence has been extended throughout the world. Arms transfers to Third World countries have grown substantially in this period. Certainly Soviet policy has been subject to many rash and alarmist interpretations in the West, but the evidence does point to a steady and significant increase in Soviet military power since the early 1960s.

In the first ten years after the end of the Second World War a clear bipolar structure emerged in world politics, with the United States and the Soviet Union as the dominant powers. Since that time new forces have emerged to transform the international system. The coming forth of the Third World as a political force was helped by the existence of the Soviet bloc, which could provide a counterweight to Western power. Fissiparous tendencies, both East and West, have further complicated international politics. By the late 1960s Japan and the E.E.C. had become major centers of economic power, while the rivalry between the Soviet Union and China had assumed military form. From the Soviet point of view the international environment had become more complex, with the ever-present danger that the various centers of power would combine in opposition to it. Indeed, elements of such a combination have been evident in the 1970s, motivated in large part by the desire to offset growing Soviet military power; in its turn, this countervailing power has provided the Soviet leaders with further reasons for military forces.

The Soviet Union now possesses large armed forces, an advanced defense industry and an extensive military R & D network. In no other area has the Soviet Union come so close to achieving the goal of "catching up and overtaking the advanced capitalist powers." As a consequence, the law of comparative advantage seems to operate in Soviet external policies, giving a major role to the military instrument. The Soviet Union conducts its central relationship with the NATO powers from a position of military strength but economic weakness. In Eastern Europe the Soviet Union has suffered political setbacks but it has used military force, and the threat of military force, to underpin its dominant position. Soviet relations with China have now acquired an important military dimension with the build-up of forces along the Chinese frontier. In the Third World the Soviet Union has used arms transfers and military advisors as a major instrument of diplomacy. Thus, in spite of the fact that the Soviet concept of the "correlation of forces," in terms of which international politics is analyzed, does not place primary emphasis on military force, rather military power has become a basic instrument of Soviet external policy.

It is not surprising that the present generation of Soviet leaders should see military power as the main guarantee of Soviet security and of the Soviet

position in the world. The men now at the top levels of leadership came to positions of some power in the late 1930s, and Brezhnev and Ustinov are only the most prominent members of this generation to have had a direct part in managing the development and production of arms. Victory in the war with Germany, the attainment of strategic parity with the United States and the long period at peace since 1945 – these are regarded by this generation as among its greatest achievements. When one considers the course of Soviet history from 1917 to 1945, it is no surprise that this should be so.

It should be clear from this brief outline how important war and the preparation for war have been in the formation of the Soviet state. This is not to say that the course of Soviet development has been determined by forces outside the Soviet Union, or that every event in Soviet history is to be explained in terms of external conditions. The rise of Stalin and his system of rule cannot be explained without reference to social, economic and political conditions in the Soviet Union. Moreover, not everything in the Stalinist period can be seen as a response to external threats. The great purge of 1936–1938 was justified in this way, but the justification was patently false and the purge greatly weakened the Red Army. But the Stalinist industrialization drive had as its major goal the development of heavy industry as the basis for economic growth and military power, and it was in these terms that it was justified.

This policy involved the extensive mobilization of the resources and energies of Soviet society, and the extraction from society of those resources by the state, which then channelled them toward the ends laid down by the Party leadership. The process was dominated by the Party–State apparatus which forced changes in social and economic relationships, extracted the resources from an often unwilling population, and managed the new economic system. In order to secure the loyalty of the Party–State apparatus, special social and economic privileges and distinctions were introduced. (It was at this time that prerevolutionary ranks began to be reintroduced into the Red Army.) The rate of extraction was very high, leaving the mass of the population with minimal living standards and sometimes (as when famine occurred) not even those. Coercion was an intrinsic part of this policy.

Victory in the war seemed to show that, whatever the "mistakes" of Stalin's policies in the immediate prewar years, the general emphasis on industrialization had been correct. After the war the high rate of extraction continued as industry was reconstructed and military rivalry with the West pursued. But since Stalin's death important changes have taken place which have a bearing on the questions of disarmament and demilitarization.

The first of these changes has involved the considerable slowing of the rate of economic growth which has provoked intensive debate about economic reform. It has been widely argued inside and outside the Soviet Union that

the system of economic planning and administration was suited to the industrialization drive, but has now become a brake on industrial development and in particular on technological innovation. Second, terror has been abandoned as a system of rule, and the Party leadership has been searching for new sources of legitimacy for the state. The repression of opposition and the silencing of dissent still take place, but greater effort has been made to engender popular support. The state has tried to cultivate favor through the provision of superior and more abundant goods and services to the mass of the population, as well as through appeals to nationalist sentiments. And finally, as a result of the greater attention that has been paid to the living standards and welfare of the population, the priorities of resource allocation have become more complex than they were under Stalin. In the rest of the paper militarizing trends in the Soviet Union will be related to these developments.

The defense sector and the Soviet economy

In the last section I sought to show how the whole structure of the Soviet state had been affected by the preparation for war and war itself. I argued that the militarization of Soviet society involves far more than the institutions directly concerned with the development, production and use of armaments. But these institutions too must be examined in order to determine their place in the structure of the state.

It was in the 1930s that the basic features of the Soviet system of economic planning and management took shape, and these have been modified rather than transformed by the various reforms of the post-war period. Oskar Lange referred to the Soviet economy as a "war economy."[19] He did so not because preparation for war was given first priority, but because the instruments of economic management in the Soviet economy were akin to those employed in capitalist economies in wartime. Lange's point was that there was nothing inherently socialist about these instruments, and furthermore that to abandon them was not tantamount to abandoning socialism. This characterization underlines the suitability of the Soviet economic system to mobilize resources in order to pursue political purposes – purposes which might include the creation of military power.

The organization of the defence sector is similar to that of the rest of

[19] O. Lange, *Papers in Economics and Sociology*, Oxford and Warsaw, 1970, p. 102.

Soviet industry.[20] The enterprises that produce arms and equipment are controlled by a series of ministries which have responsibility for the different branches of the sector. The work of these ministries is in turn planned by the central planning agencies (in line with the general policy laid down by the Politburo), since the activities of the defense sector must be coordinated with those of the rest of the economy. There are, however, special institutional arrangements in the defense sector which are designed to ensure that military production has priority claim to scarce resources. In this sense the defense sector is distinct from the rest of the economy.

Since the war, some important changes have taken place in the defense sector. It has expanded to include new branches of production, with particular attention to the development of nuclear weapons, rockets and electronics systems. Along with this expansion has come the creation of an extensive network of research and development (R&D) establishments to provide the basis for innovations in weapons technologies. These establishments are controlled by the production ministries in the defense sector. The size of the network is impossible to determine with any precision, but the number of establishments must be in the hundreds, while those engaged in military research and development must number in the hundreds of thousands. Research institutes from outside the defense sector – for example, from the Academy of Sciences – are also drawn into military work. In military R&D, as in production, there are special arrangements to ensure that performance is as effective as possible.

Military R&D is more effective than civilian R&D in the Soviet Union. The defense sector is well suited to the development and production of follow-on systems (for example, of tanks) where no great shift of mission or technology is required. The Soviet Union has also been able to organize large-scale innovation when the political leaders have deemed it necessary; the R&D system is well suited to the concentration of resources on specific goals such as the development of the atomic bomb or the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile. It is not so well adapted to the lateral or horizontal transfer of technology across departmental boundaries, unless this is organized as a matter of priority from above.[21]

The defense sector is, nevertheless, part and parcel of the Soviet economy,

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[20]For a discussion of the organization and functioning of the defense sector see my 'Soviet Military R & D: Managing the Research-Production Cycle', in J. Thomas and U. Kruse-Vancienne (eds.) *Soviet Science and Technology*, published by the George Washington University for the National Science Foundation, Washington D.C., 1977, pp. 179-229; for a more detailed discussion see my two chapters in R. Amann and J. Cooper (eds.) *Innovation in Soviet Industry*, forthcoming.

[21]See my paper 'The Soviet Style of Military R & D' in F.A. Long and J. Reppy (eds.) *The Genesis of New Weapons. Decision-Making for Military R & D.* (forthcoming)

and the civilian technological base has an important influence on the performance of military R&D. Moreover, the patterns of weapons development and production cannot be understood without reference to the overall system of economic planning and management. Soviet planners have tried to protect the defense sector from shortcomings elsewhere in the economy, and this has resulted in a degree of separation from the rest of industry. But this separation must be viewed in its proper context. The defense sector produces civilian goods on a large scale. Passenger aircraft, merchants ships and consumer durables are but a few examples. Further, branches outside the defense sector produce goods for military use, while other ministries – for example, those of Civil Aviation and Communications – appear to be closely tied into the military infrastructure. Special military departments exist in these ministries to ensure that military needs are looked after there. Thus, the requirements of the Armed Forces extend throughout the economy, as do the arrangements for ensuring that these requirements are met.

Soviet military–economic policy is ostensibly guided by three main principles :

— the maintenance of a high level of armaments production;
— the ensuring of the flexibility of the economy (for example, flexibility in shifting from civilian to military production, in raising the rate of arms production or in introducing new weapons);
— the securing of the viability of the economy in wartime.[22]

These principles were elaborated in the 1930s and are still taken as the most important indicators of the state's economic potential – that is, of its ability to provide for the material needs of society while producing everything necessary for war. Certain features of the defense sector – the protection of plants against bomb damage, preparation of civilian enterprises for conversion to defense production, and the existence of "buffer production" of civilian goods at defense plants – can be seen as attempts to follow these tenets. It is, however, more difficult to implement these principles now than it was in the 1930s, when, even then, they were not always practiced.

In spite of the flexibility recommended, the available evidence suggests that there is considerable stability in the defense sector and that this has a major influence on its mode of operation. The research institutes and design bureaus (where new weapons are created) are funded from the budget. Apparently the financial well-being of these operations does not depend directly on orders for specific systems. Coupled with the institutional continuity of the military R&D network, this provides the basis for a steady effort

[22] *Markizm-Leninizm o voine i armii*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 258–9.

in the design and development of weapons. Consequently a strong tendency to create "follow-on" systems can be discerned. Stable production, with no major variation in output from year to year, appears also to be a feature of the defense sector. There have been exceptions to this trend, however, especially in the Khrushchev period, but the available data are too crude for registering any but the largest fluctuations in production, so that firm conclusions should not be drawn from them. In theory, the existence of "buffer production" at defense industry plants should create flexibility but, as far as can be seen, it does not do so in fact.[23]

Besides the stability of its structure and operations, the defense sector is marked by the continuity in office of its leading managers. For example, D.F. Ustinov, the present Minister of Defense, became People's Commissar (i.e. Minister) of Armament in 1941, and until his appointment to his present position in 1976 he played a major role in weapons development and production. Another example is the case of Ye.P. Slavskii, Minister of Medium Machine-Building (in charge of nuclear weapons development and production), who has held that position since 1957 and has been involved in the nuclear weapons program since 1946.

The managers of the defense industry form a cohesive group, with interlocking careers. There is, however, little evidence that they have acted together as a lobby. The one occasion on which they seem to have done so was in the period 1957 to 1965, when they took part, with some success, in the resistance to Khrushchev's decentralization of the system of economic planning and management. In 1963, after some recentralization had taken place, Khrushchev indicated his dissatisfaction with Ustinov and the "metaleaters" and complained that secrecy made it difficult to criticize the shortcomings of the defense industry.[24] The opposition of the defense industry managers seems to have rested on the grounds that economic reorganization threatened the special position of the defense sector and thus its ability to perform effectively. It is also possible that defense spending and specific weapons programs may have been at issue. It would be wrong to assume that the defense industry managers will always share the same views on military spending or economic reform. If one considers the fact that the performance of the defense sector depends – perhaps increasingly – on the performance of the rest of Soviet industry, and that the different branches of the defense sector relate to the rest of the economy in different ways, it becomes clear why a shared pattern of arms is unlikely.

This is the only occasion on which the performance of the defense sector

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[23]See Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China – 1978, Part 4 – Soviet Union*, Washington D.C.

[24]*Pravda*, 26 April, 1963; Tatu, *op. cit.*, pp. 343–4.

emerged as an issue in the argument over economic reform. In the post-Stalin period there have been intense debates on the need to reform the systems of economic planning and administration in order to stimulate technological innovation. In the 1960s it was widely held by Soviet and foreign economists alike that sooner or later the Soviet leaders would have to choose between a planned and a market economy, and, further, that any significant reform would involve a move toward some form of "market socialism." Such a reform would not be incompatible with a high level of defense expenditure. Even if the Soviet Union now devotes 12 to 15 per cent of its GNP to defense (and this is the upper range of Western estimates) this level could be maintained in an economy where the market played a significant role. After all, some capitalist countries devote a higher proportion of their GNP to defense without specifically instituting a "war economy."[25] Thus the present Soviet system of economic planning and management cannot be said to be entailed by the level of defense expenditure. This is not to deny, of course, that the managers who have been used to working the present system might be fearful of changes on the grounds that their high priority position would be jeopardized.

In any event the choice of market socialism has not been made in the Soviet Union. The Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 was a major setback for the Soviet advocates of far-reaching reform, because the political developments in Czechoslovakia were widely seen as the consequence of economic reform. The problems of economic growth and technological progress have not vanished in the Soviet Union, however, and piecemeal reform has been under way. Interestingly, the trend of reform in the 1970s has been to take the defense sector as a model for the rest of the economy. At the XXIV Party Congress in 1971, Brezhnev declared that

> taking into account the high scientific-technical level of defense industry, the transmission of its experience, inventions and discoveries to all spheres of our economy acquires the highest importance.[26]

In the 1970s certain organizational features and management techniques – especially in the area of technological innovation – have been borrowed from the defense sector and applied in civilian industry.[27] This marks an attempt to use the defense sector as a model or dynamo of technological progress in the economy as a whole. There may also have been an effort to increase

[25] Iran and Israel are two examples. See *World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook* 1979, London, p. 43.

[26] *Materialy XXIV s"vezda KPSS*, Moscow, 1971, p. 46.

[27] See especially Julian Cooper, *Innovation for Innovation in Soviet Industry*, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Birmingham, Discussion Paper, Series RCB/11, 1979, pp. 87–92.

the production of non-military goods in the defense sector. For the first time since the five-year plans were instituted, the ninth plan (1971–75) called for a more rapid rate of growth for light industry than for heavy industry. About the time of the XXIV Congress a number of articles appeared in the press listing the non-military goods produced in the defense industry.

It is not altogether clear, however, that this direction of reform will prove to be effective. It is true that the defense sector has performed more successfully than civilian industry, especially in bringing new technologies into production. But it may not be possible to reproduce the conditions of success in civilian industry. The effort to boost consumer goods production in the ninth five-year plan did not achieve the desired results.[28] There are various explanations for this. One is that international crises – especially the Middle East War of 1973 – interfered with the plan. A more interesting reason is that the priority of military production is a matter not only of central decision-making, but also of the structure of industry and the attitudes of workers and managers. This was clearly illustrated by an article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* in 1972 and the correspondence that it provoked. The author of the article pointed out that in numerous ways – in prestige, in the priority given by other ministries (for example in construction projects), in wages, in cultural and housing facilities, in labor turnover – light industry fared worse than heavy industry.[29] One of the correspondents wrote that

> The best conditions are given to the so-called "leading" branches. Then we have the remaining enterprises in Group A/heavy industry/. Last in line are the Group B enterprises. Naturally the most highly skilled cadres – workers, engineers or technicians – find jobs or try to find them where the pay is highest, so they are concentrated in the "leading" branches of industry. What is more, these branches receive the best materials, the most advanced technology, the latest equipment etc. etc. . . . . Even at the same machine-building enterprise, in the production of "prestige" output and Group B output, there is no comparison in quality and in the attitude to the categories of output (in terms of technology, design work, management, pay, etc.)[30]

There is little doubt that within heavy industry the defense sector occupies the position of highest prestige, and therefore shows these features to the highest degree.

A further factor in the successful performance of the defense sector has been the powerful customer it has in the Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff draw up requirements, issue specifications, supervise weapons development, conduct trials and exercise quality control

[28] See *Narodnoe Khozyaisvo SSSR v 1977g*, Moscow, 1978, pp. 120–121 where Group B output is shown to have declined as a proportion of total industrial output between 1970 and 1976.

[29] A. Levikov, " 'A' i 'B' ", in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 15 November 1972, p. 11.

[30] *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 7 February 1973, p. 10.

during production. In this way they have considerable control over the weapons acquisition process. Backed by the high priority which the Party leaders have given to defense, this managerial role helps the Armed Forces to get what they want out of the defense industry. Although some features of the defense sector can be transferred to civilian industry, this is one important condition that it would not be easy to reproduce there.

The Soviet system of economic planning and administration has not been altered fundamentally since it was first established. It remains a relatively effective mechanism for extracting resources from the economy and directing them to the goals set by the political leaders, and one of the most important of these goals has been the creation of military power. The defense sector occupies a key – and in some respects a privileged – position in this system, not only in terms of central priorities, but also in terms of the organization of industry and the attitudes of workers and managers. The debates about economic reform have resulted in piecemeal changes rather than in a fundamental transformation of the system. As has been previously noted, there has been a tendency over the last ten years to use the defense sector as a model for the rest of industry. In terms of the militarization of the Soviet economy, this is an ambiguous development. On the one hand, it testifies to a political concern about the performance of civilian industry; on the other, it highlights the special position and performance of the defense sector.

The armed forces and the rationales for military power

There is little evidence of opposition inside the Soviet Union to Soviet military policy. Since 1965 there have been few if any indications of disagreement in the Party leadership about the level of military expenditure. This contrasts with the Khrushchev period when military outlays did provide a focus of political argument. And in the dissident *samizdat* literature, although sharp criticism has been made of many features of Soviet life, few voices have been raised against the military policy of the Soviet state. Among the few exceptions are the warnings which Andrei Sakharov has given the West of the growing military power of the Soviet Union; moreover, Sakharov's background in nuclear weapons development makes him in this instance a very special case. Thus the situation is notably different from that in the United States where militarism and racism formed the chief targets of protest in the 1960s and 1970s. There are many reasons for this difference, but the chief one appears to be that inside the Soviet Union the Soviet military effort is widely seen as being legitimate and as pursuing legitimate goals. Curiously

this is so even in spite of the fact that the burden of military expenditure is greater than in all the NATO countries and despite the many competing claims for the resources which are devoted to defense.

One of the main reasons for the Russians' acceptance of Soviet military policy is no doubt that for the last thirty to thirty-five years the Soviet Union has enjoyed a period of peace and internal stability. This current era stands in sharp contrast to the wars and upheavals of the first half of the century. The Soviet Armed Forces have seen very little combat since 1945 – certainly nothing to compare with the military role of the American, British and French forces. The Soviet claim that Soviet military strength is conducive to peace does not, therefore, fly directly in the face of reality. This is one reason why there has been, in the Soviet view, no contradiction between the processes of political detente and the growth of Soviet military power. Soviet military power is regarded as a crucial element in detente because it makes it impossible for the West to deal with the Soviet Union from a position of superior strength or to unconstrainedly use its armed forces throughout the world.[31]

Although Soviet forces have been engaged in relatively little combat since 1945, military power is certainly regarded by the Soviet leaders as a positive contribution to their political purposes. The main objective of their policy has been to prevent the West from conducting offensive actions – whether military or political – against the Soviet Union and its allies. Soviet military aid to Third World countries is to be seen in the same context. Since the 1960s the Soviet Union has come to use its military power – in the form of advisors and arms transfers – more frequently as a way of undermining the West's power and thus increasing its own influence. (There may now be an economic element in Soviet arms transfers : excess production can be exchanged – in some instances – for hard currency. But the primary rationale is still political).[32]

But military power has also been a major factor in Soviet relations with socialist states. The Soviet Union used military force in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 in order to maintain its dominant position in Eastern Europe. The underpinning of that position is the ever-present threat of military force, however tacitly that threat may be conveyed. In the

[31]See, for example, S. Tynshkevich, 'Sootnoshenie sil v mire i faktory predotvrashcheniya voiny, *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, 1974, no. 10, p. 16; N.A. Kosolapov, 'Sotsialno-psikhologicheskie aspekty razryadki', *Voprosy filosofii*, 1974, no. 4, pp. 36-7; V.M. Kulish (ed.) *Voennaya sila i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, Moscow, 1972, ch. 1.

[32]See *World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1979*, London, pp. 172-3; G. Ofer, 'Soviet Military Aid to the Middle East,' Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, Washington D.C., 1976, pp. 216-239.

1960s the confrontation with China assumed a military form with the build-up of forces along the Chinese frontier. Thus, in addition to its other uses, Soviet military power has been employed as an instrument to create and sustain Soviet domination over other states.

As Soviet military strength has grown, new roles have been found for it, particularly in the projection of power far from the Soviet frontiers.[33] In the late 1960s the Soviet Union attained strategic parity with the United States and on that basis entered into negotiations to limit strategic arms. In the context of Western debates about the nature of Soviet policy, even that statement is controversial because there are those who point to Soviet military doctrine as indicating a striving for overall superiority. This is a rather complex issue, and it does appear that at least some elements in the Armed Forces have opposed the acceptance of parity; but Brezhnev's recent statements to the effect that parity and equality are the goals of Soviet policy must be taken as authoritative statements of Soviet military doctrine.[34]

Of course, it remains extremely difficult to say what constitutes parity or equality (does it mean equality with one particular state, or with all potential enemies combined?). And acceptance of this principle still leaves great scope for disagreement both within and between the negotiating states. Moreover, the reason that the principle of parity provides a basis for negotiation between the Soviet Union and the United States resides in their having so many more nuclear weapons than other states. In fact, the disproportion of weapons is so extreme that even the other nuclear powers can be largely dismissed from the issue. But does every state have the right to parity? Obviously not, since the Non-Proliferation Treaty represents a commitment – however convoluted – to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Negotiations between the superpowers on the basis of parity aligns with their attempt to prevent other states from attaining that status. Precisely because the Soviet Union and the United States are using arms control negotiations in this double-edged way, they are likely to stimulate other states to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Consequently, arms control negotiations on the basis of parity are by no means the foundation for a process of radical demilitarization.

In spite of the acceptance of parity as the basis for negotiations to limit strategic arms, it remains true that there are major differences between Soviet and American strategic thought. American thinking has laid particular emphasis on the ability, under all circumstances, to inflict widespread destruction on the enemy. Soviet thinking, on the other hand, has been concerned

[33]This appears to have been the subject of argument and debate in Moscow in the 1970s. See Kulish, op. cit.; and S.G. Gorshkov, *Morskaya Moshch Gosudarstv*, Moscow, 1976. Admiral Gorshkov is Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.

[34]See, in particular, the article on military doctrine in *Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopedia*, vol. 3, Moscow 1977, pp. 225–9, for the Soviet position.

with minimizing the damage to Soviet society in the event of nuclear war. Even in a relationship of parity, Soviet policy has been directed toward limiting the vulnerability of the Soviet Union to nuclear attack, and ensuring the functioning of Soviet society in wartime. Whether this can be achieved is very doubtful, but it does appear to be the rationale behind important elements of Soviet military, military-economic and civil defense policies, and it does have important implications for the militarization of Soviet society.

The bulk of the Soviet forces is made up of the five branches of service: the Strategic Rocket Forces, the National Air Defense Forces, the Air Forces, the Ground Forces and the Navy. There are also special forces which sometimes engage in civilian work. The Construction Troops carry out construction work for the Armed Forces and for civilian projects of high priority; the Academic City near Novosibirsk, where the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences is based, is an example of their work. The Railroad and Road Troops play an important part in building and maintaining the Soviet rail and road communications system. All of these are natural offshoots of the Soviet Armed Forces. But there are three elements of the Soviet military system which are of greater interest from the point of view of the militarization of Soviet society. These are the civil defense organization, DOSAAF (*Dobrovol'noe obshchestvo sodeistviya armii, aviatsii i flotu* – the Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation and the Navy), and the system of military-patriotic education. All are designed to strengthen the ability of the Soviet Union to defend itself, and all have political functions beyond that goal.

Soviet civil defense has three major objectives: to provide protection for the population against weapons of mass destruction; to ensure stable operation of the economy in wartime; and to counteract the effects of enemy use of weapons of mass destruction.[35] Civil defense organizations may also take part in disaster relief operations. The effectiveness of the civil defense effort is very difficult to judge because it would depend so much on the way in which nuclear war was initiated. It could not prevent widespread destruction, although it could reduce its scale. It has been estimated that 100 000 full-time personnel are engaged in civil defense work at all levels of the governmental and economic structure.[36] There is an extensive program of education and training which is designed to enable the population to carry out civil defense measures should the need arise.

This might suggest a policy of subordinating the working of the society in general and the economy in particular to the contingencies of war. But

[35]See the article on civil defense in *Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopedia*, vol. 3, Moscow 1977, pp. 23–5.

[36]CIA : *Soviet Civil Defense*, NI 78–10003, Washington D.C., July 1978, p. 2.

it would not always be possible to put such a policy into practice. For example, the strategic and widespread siting of industrial plants is an essential measure for ensuring the viability of the economy in wartime; but there is no evidence that this need has been seriously addressed. One can only assume this is so because of the overall costs of moving and because of the need for new plants to be near suppliers, transport networks, and labor supply. More generally still, the civil defense effort does not appear to have been met with great enthusiasm on the part of a population which may not be convinced of either its necessity or its effectiveness.[37]

DOSAAF has as its main aim the strengthening of the Soviet Union's defense capability by means of training the Soviet people for the defense of the socialist fatherland.[38] DOSAAF is open to all Soviet citizens over the age of fourteen and has approximately 80 million members. Its main activities are: military-patriotic education; the training of young people for service in the Armed Forces; training in technical skills; the dissemination of military-technical knowledge; and the direction of sports which have military-technical significance. DOSAAF has clubs and sports facilities and is organized at factories, farms, educational institutions and so on. It seems clear that DOSAAF's activities are of substantial help to the Armed Forces in providing its recruits with skills which will be useful during military service, while also raising the physical and technical level of the Soviet population. (Its work is similarly useful to Soviet industry.) Partly because so much of what DOSAAF does is done by non-military organizations in the West, it is a significant fact that in the Soviet Union it is the goals of military preparedness and defense capability that provide the justification and the driving force for activities of this kind. Here again, the importance of the military factor as a modernizing force in Soviet society is evident.

Both civil defense and DOSAAF contribute to the Soviet Union's ability to defend itself. They also contribute to the more diffuse process of military-patriotic education.

> Military-patriotic education is called upon to instill a readiness to perform military duty, responsibility for strengthening the defense capability of the country, respect for the Soviet Armed Forces, pride in the Motherland and the ambition to preserve and increase the heroic traditions of the Soviet people. Military-patriotic education is carried out in the teaching process in secondary and higher educational establishments, in the system of political education, by means of propaganda in the press, on radio and television, and with the help of various forms of mass-political work and of artistic and literary works. Of great significance for military-patriotic education is the mastery of basic military and military-technical skills which young people acquire in secondary schools, technical

[37] ibid., pp. 3–5.

[38] See Odom, *loc. cit.*, pp. 44–7; *Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopedia*, vol. 3, Moscow 1977, pp. 255–7.

schools, higher educational establishments, in studies at the houses of defense and technical creativity, aero, auto motor and radio clubs, at the young technicians' stations, in military-patriotic schools, defense circles, at points of pre-induction training, in civil defense formations. Physical training with an applied military bent presupposes the development of qualities of will, courage, hardiness, strength, speed of reaction, and helps to raise psychological stability, trains the sight, hearing etc.[39]

As this quotation makes clear, military-patriotic education is a pervasive feature of Soviet life. It is of certain value to Soviet defense capability insofar as it helps both to create physically strong, well-trained young people and to give them the basic skills and develop the psychological qualities needed for military service. Indeed, the emphasis on military-patriotic education was strengthened in the late 1960s, in association with the 1967 Law on Military Service, and it is now designed to ensure that the Armed Forces' manpower requirements are met, even with shorter terms of military service.[40]

If the military-patriotic education is directed toward satisfying the practical needs of the Armed Forces it is also focussed on increasing support for, and loyalty to, the Party and the Soviet state. It represents a fusion of communist, nationalist and military appeals. The Great Patriotic War occupies a key position in the program of military-patriotic education providing examples and illustrations of the desired qualities. This moment in history, as we have noted, was a time when the Party and the people were most closely united in a common purpose. Military-patriotic education is evidently an effort to recapture that bond and to reinforce it by tapping a deep source of sentiment in the Soviet people. In fact, this very particular form of education can be seen as a response to the problems of legitimation that the Soviet state has faced in the post-Stalin period.

Since this military-patriotic education does not represent a glorification of war, it should be clearly distinguished from Fascist militarism. Indeed, the Party's peace policy (the effectiveness of which as we know is seen to rest on Soviet military power) is an essential component of the program of education. But one might wonder how effective the program is in instilling the desired qualities in a population that seems far from producing the ideal of the "new Soviet man." At the very least, military-patriotic education will help to engender an acceptance of the Party's military policy and a belief in the importance of military power. In this way it will help to sustain the Soviet military effort and the special position which the defense sector and the Armed Forces enjoy in Soviet society.

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[39] *Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopedia*, vol. 2, Moscow 1976, p. 245.
[40] Odom, *loc. cit.*, p. 44.

A military–industrial state?

As a major instrument of Soviet external policy the Armed Forces naturally enjoy an important position in the Party–State apparatus. Positions in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff are occupied overwhelmingly by professional officers who have spent their entire careers in the Armed Forces. Since 1945 the post of Minister has most often been held by a professional soldier (although the present Minister, Ustinov, has spent most of his professional life in the defense industry). The chief functions of the Ministry and the General Staff are like those of similar institutions in other countries: to draw up plans, develop strategy and tactics, gather and evaluate intelligence about potential enemies, educate and train the troops, and administer the whole network of military institutions. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union does not have an extensive network of civilian institutions conducting research into military operations, and so operational analysis is done largely within the Armed Forces.

One might think that the existence of a large military establishment within the state would pose difficult problems of civil–military relations and threaten the Party's dominant position in Soviet society. It is certainly true that there have been elements of conflict and tension in Party–military relations; but the principle of Party supremacy has never seriously been threatened. There are special mechanisms of control in the Armed Forces, the most important of which – the Main Political Administration – functions both within the Ministry of Defense and as a department of the Central Committee. Some Western observers have seen in this organization an institutionalized Party distrust of the military.[41] In fact this view is mistaken. The Main Political Administration could more properly be seen as a bridge between the Party and the Armed Forces and as a symbol of their unity in the assumptions that they share about the importance of military power for the Soviet state[42].

The Soviet Union embodies an apparent paradox: within this social system, the military, while an important political force, is not the dominant one. This is not to say that the Armed Forces – or, more particularly, the members of the High Command – have not played a role in the political crises of the post–Stalin period. In each case of the leadership's changing – Beria's arrest and execution in 1953, Malenkov's defeat by Khrushchev in 1955, the

[41]This has been a very widespread view, advanced most thoroughly in R. Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, Princeton 1967.

[42]T. Colton, *Commanders, Commisars and Civilian Authority*, Cambridge, Mass., 1979, argues that the Main Political Administration in effect identifies with the Military. See also R. Fritsch-Bournazel, 'Les Forces Armees et la "societe socialiste avancee" ' *Pouvoirs* 1978, no.6, pp. 55–64.

defeat of the "anti-Party group" in 1957 and Khrushchev's fall in 1964 – members of the High Command have played some role. But military support was one factor among others, and probably not the decisive one. Moreover, Marshal Zhukov's disgrace in 1957, only months after he had helped Khrushchev to defeat the "anti-Party group" in the Central Committee, showed that engaging in leadership politics can be a risky business for soldiers. The specter of Bonapartism was conjured up by Khrushchev as a major justification for Zhukov's removal from office. Even though it appears to have been a contrived justification, it underlines the determination of the Party leadership to retain its supremacy over the Armed Forces.[43] Military involvement has been made possible only by splits in the Party leadership, and on no occasion has it resulted in a conflict in which Party leaders were ranged on one side and the military on the other. Indeed, the High Command has had its own internal politics and divisions.

The political quiescence of the Armed Forces is to be explained by reference not so much to the formal mechanisms of Party and secret police control as to the way in which military interests have been given priority in Party policy. To say this is not to minimize Stalin's brutal treatment of the Armed Forces or to deny that Khrushchev often pursued policies that were distasteful to the High Command. But by stressing the importance of international conflict and national solidarity, the Party has provided an ideological framework which gives clear meaning to the Armed Forces' existence. Party policy has also given the officer corps a privileged position (in terms of material satisfaction) and high status in Soviet society. Finally, the professional interests of the officer corps have been generally well served, especially regarding the allocation of resources to defense and the opportunities for their career advancement; in the matter of political leadership, the Armed Forces have been less well served although, with some glaring exceptions, this has been cautious and capable, avoiding adventurous policies which would incur the risk of war.[44]

Since Stalin's death in 1953, and more particularly since Khrushchev's fall from power in 1964, officers have been given considerable freedom in discussing questions of military policy as well as a greater voice in the policy-making process. This has resulted from the general diffusion of power at the center of the Soviet state, and has parallels in other areas of Soviet life where vigorous debates have been conducted about matters of policy. The Brezhnev Politburo has placed great emphasis on "scientific" policy-making and on expert and technically competent advice. Although this is a development

[43]For an analysis that suggests that the charges against Zhukov were unfounded and that the affair should not be interpreted as a Party–military conflict see Colton, *op. cit.*, ch. 8.
[44]Colton, *op. cit.*, pp. 257–75.

of considerable importance to Soviet politics, it does not mean that the Politburo has relinquished its authority over such major decisions as the particular uses of military power of the scale of the military effort. Nor does it mean that requests from the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff will always be granted. In resource allocation, for example, the Politburo has to respond to many pressures from many areas, not only to those from the Armed Forces. Moreover, there is an inherent tension in the policy of ensuring popular support for the State through the provision of goods and services; for, while this policy requires investment in light industry and agriculture, the coexistent pursuit of economic growth means that the civilian branches of heavy industry and the production of energy cannot be neglected. Thus, there are important constraints – both economic and political – on Soviet military policy.

In spite of these constraints, the Armed Forces and the defense industry occupy an entrenched position in the Party–state apparatus. The high priority which the Party leadership has given to military power has, accordingly, become institutionalized. The opposition which Khrushchev's policies encountered indicates that any attempt to effect a drastic shift in priority away from the area of defense would run into opposition from not only military and industrial circles, but also from within the Party.

The diffusion of power has created what some writers refer to as "institutional pluralism."[45] Like any form of pluralism, however, this one is imperfect in that within it, some groups and institutions have more power than others. In this case it is the Armed Forces and the defense industry who occupy special positions. The Armed Forces enjoy wide prestige as the embodiment of national power and integrity (a prestige which is enhanced by the extensive program of military–patriotic education). The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff are institutions of undisputed competence. Given their monopoly on experts in military affairs, there is no civilian institution able to challenge them. Furthermore, the high priority given to the requirements of the defense sector is an intrinsic part of the system of economic planning and administration. The reason for this is clear. In the age of a "scientific–technical revolution," the defense industry has been in the forefront of Soviet technological progress; and so it is seen by the Party leaders as something to be emulated rather than restricted. A final reason for the emphasis on defense lies in the fact that key aspects of military policy are shrouded in secrecy. This limits criticism of both the preferred treatment given to defense in terms of resource allocation and also of the employment of those resources.

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[45] 'The Soviet System : Petrification or Pluralism', in J. Hough, *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory*, Cambridge, Mass. 1977, pp. 19–48.

The final decisions on military policy rest with the Politburo, and with the Defense Council, which comprises several leading Politburo members under Brezhnev's chairmanship. Whatever criticism of the defense sector may be expressed or quashed, all the evidence points to the existence of a set of shared assumptions among the leaders about military power and military expenditure. There are differences of view, no doubt, but these appear to be marginal, and the overall policy seems to rest on a broad consensus.[46] It is, however, possible that this state of affairs will change in the post-Brezhnev leadership and that the level of concentration on and in the military will become an issue of contention as it was under Khrushchev. Should this come to pass, the institutional power of the Armed Forces and the defense industry might figure critically in determining the outcome.

Can we speak then of a Soviet "military-industrial complex"? It is true that there is a large military establishment and a large defense industry. But the term often carries theoretical connotations that make it inapplicable on many counts to the Soviet Union. Sometimes it suggests a degenerate pluralism in which the balanced interplay of interests has been undermined by links between the armed forces and industry; in this sense it is not appropriate because it implies both too great a degree of pluralism – as well as wrongly implying pluralism as a norm – for the Soviet Union. Sometimes it is taken to mean that the driving force of arms policies is the pursuit of profit by capitalist enterprises; this too would by definition not apply. In this context Garaudy has argued that the Soviet Union is a "bureaucratic-military complex" – that is, a military-industrial complex without the economic driving-force.[47] An objection of a yet different kind is summarized in the statement that the Soviet Union does not *have* a military-industrial complex, but *is* such a complex. However overstated, this view does make the point that the bonded nature of the history of the Soviet Union with its military power makes curious the suggestion of the one acting within the other.

Whether or not we say the armed forces and the defense industry constitute a military-industrial complex in the Soviet Union matters less than the fact that they exhibit many features that are identified as a characteristic of such a complex. Although many of these features are part of the American defense sector, because of the way in which the Soviet economic system is organized it does not exhibit these features in the same way, or to the same degree. For example, within the weapons development process, there is competition between offensive and defensive systems, with new technology in one area

[46]For a discussion of marginal shifts of resources see J. Hardt, 'Military-Economic Implications of Soviet Regional Policy', prepared for Colloquium at NATO Economic Directorate, Brussels, April 1979.

[47]R. Garaudy, *The Turning-Point of Socialism*, London 1970, p. 138.

stimulating innovation in another. This may happen without any direct outside stimulus. Second, the military R&D system shows considerable inertia in its operations, thus generating strong pressure for follow-on systems. Third, the R&D system does not appear to have a strong innovative dynamic of its own. Intervention by the political leadership is required for major innovations; but because the Party leaders have devoted so much attention to this area, such intervention is often forthcoming. Fourth, the military R&D system is not especially conducive to the cross-fertilization of technologies to produce new weapons, but this may happen as designers search for ways of meeting new requirements. Finally, the steadiness of Soviet arms policies may be accounted for, in part, by the planning to which weapons development and production are subject.[48]

The Soviet military effort, which was born of international rivalry, is now rooted in the structure of the Soviet state. This is not to say, of course, that the external stimuli have vanished. It is clear that foreign actions do affect Soviet arms policies. This can be seen both in the histories of specific weapons systems and in the direction of overall policy.[49] The advanced capitalist powers have set the pace in making major weapons innovations, and this has served to stimulate Soviet military technology. Of course it must be borne in mind that military power rests not only on the quality of military technology, but also on its quantity and on the capacity for troops to use it. Although the balance of these two elements may change, the arms race has never been a question of but one or the other; for where Western military technology may have spurred Soviet weapons development, it has often been justified by the Soviet's strength in numbers.

It would be wrong, therefore, to deny the effects of foreign actions on Soviet arms policies. But it would be equally mistaken to see Soviet policy as merely a reaction to Western actions. Foreign influences are atomized through the Soviet policy-making process, in which Soviet perceptions, military doctrine, foreign policy objectives and domestic influences and constraints come into play. The effect of foreign actions on Soviet policy is complex and not at all automatic. In many cases it is the combining of foreign influences with domestic factors which speeds up the internal dynamic of Soviet arms policies.[50]

The very existence of large armed forces, a powerful defense industry and an extensive network of military R&D establishments generates internal

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[48]See my 'The Soviet Style of Military R & D', *loc. cit.*

[49]A very clear example is Soviet atomic bomb development. See my *Entering the Nuclear Arms Race: The Soviet Decision to Build the Atomic Bomb*, Working Paper No. 9, International Security Studies Program, Wilson Center, Washington D.C. 1979.

[50]See my 'Research Note : Soviet Thermonuclear Research', *International Security*, Winter 1979/80.

pressures for weapons development and production. The interplay of demand and invention gives rise to proposals for new and improved weapons. As a system progresses from conception to development, military and design bureau interests become attached to it, building up pressure for production. Should it pass into production (here a decision by the Party leadership would be required for major systems) enterprise managers are likely to favor long production runs. Of course, not all proposals result in weapons that are deployed. But the stability of the Soviet military effort suggests that more than enough proposals are forthcoming to keep production at a relatively steady level and to ensure continuing modernization of Soviet forces.

Dieter Senghaas has pointed to two principles which are important in understanding military–industrial complexes and which can be applied in the Soviet case.[51] The first of these is the principle of "configurative causality." This formulation states that the overall configuration of the complex can be seen to give rise to pressures, however varying and undefined, for increased arms production. The second principle is that of "overdetermination" or "redundant causation", which states that the elimination of causes is not the elimination of the policies themselves since other causes alone can perpetuate them. This principle lies behind the argument which states that it is not enough to tackle the international causes of the East–West arms competition; its domestic roots too must be eradicated. Both these principles are helpful in understanding Soviet arms policies. Although much of Soviet military policy-making is shrouded in secrecy, enough is known about its structure to suggest that within the military effort the generation of internal pressure coexists with an increased inertia. It seems clear too that the removal of external stimuli, while it might alter Soviet arms policies in some important respects (for example, making it less technologically innovative), would not eliminate its driving force entirely, because much of that force is derived from domestic sources. (Nor could one say that military power would wither away because it had no role: it has been noted already that as Soviet military power has expanded it has acquired new roles.) The question then is: how are these domestic sources to be weakened?

Conclusion

The aim of this essay has been to outline the domestic sources of the Soviet military effort. It has suggested that these sources are deeply embedded

[51] Senghaas, *op. cit.*, pp. 361–4.

in Russian and Soviet history. Disarmament and demilitarization would therefore involve more than the surgical removal of some element of the Soviet state; it would have far-reaching effects throughout the whole society. Indeed, complete disarmament and demilitarization could come about only with the destruction of the international state system, if then. And although the "withering away of the state" is one of the anticipated consequences of communist construction, the Soviet Union has one of the most powerful and extensive state apparatuses in the world. Yet, although the sources of Soviet militarism are strong, this essay has tried to present them as not absolute, and to suggest that there is some scope for initiatives of demilitarization. There are developments in the Soviet Union today which suggest that a change of direction is possible. It would be a serious error to overestimate their importance or the degree to which they can be influenced from outside the Soviet Union. It would be an even greater mistake to suppose that no change is possible or that the direction of change could not be influenced from afar.

Soviet military policy contains several contradictions which may, with time, become more apparent and exert an influence on Soviet politics. Having attained equality of superpower status with the United States, the Soviet Union is now faced with a new set of questions about military power and the direction of its policy. The Soviet leaders have said that they are not striving for superiority, but they have made it clear that they will not fall behind the United States in military power. The Soviet Union has thus locked itself into a relationship of parity with the United States. At one level the maintenance of parity – along with the arms control negotiations which it underpins – provides the justification for Soviet military policy. At another level, however, the attainment of parity has meant that the Soviet Union has come to share full responsibility for the continuing arms competition. This has had a subtle yet profound effect on the attitude toward Soviet military policy of many people in the West. Many of those sympathetic to Soviet policy deemed it legitimate for the leading socialist state to catch up with the leading capitalist power; but sharing responsibility for the arms race is regarded less favorably, especially in view of the danger of nuclear war. Similarly, the continuation of a high level of military effort, even after parity has been attained, may help to breed opposition inside the Soviet Union to the amassing of more military power. It is possible, for example, that Soviet militarism may emerge as an important focus for dissident criticism. But the strength of nationalist sentiment and the deep roots of legitimation should not be forgotten.

The performance of the Soviet Union shares with that of the United States the contradiction that growing military power does not bring greater security. The accumulation of military power may only spur other governments to

increase their own forces, thus nullifying the original gain. Though it is true that military power can further foreign policy, it cannot ensure complete security in the nuclear age. The "Soviet military build-up" of the 1960s and 1970s has brought the Soviet Union political gains, but it has also helped to stimulate countervailing actions, and it is highly doubtful whether, in the last analysis, Soviet security is more assured now than it was fifteen years ago. Moreover, the extension of Soviet military power throughout the world increases the risk that the Soviet Union will become embroiled in a military adventure which will arouse opposition at home. The failure of military power to ensure security should, in principle, underscore the importance of pursuing security through non-military cooperative arrangements rather than of seeking to provide one's own security at the expense of others.

These contradictions would be of little importance if there were no possibility of giving them political significance. The last fifteen years have been a period of consolidation and conservative reform in the Soviet Union. But beneath the stable surface, changes have been taking place which could result in major shifts in Soviet policy. The decline of economic growth has increased the prospect that pressure for far-reaching reform will reemerge. Agricultural performance has improved greatly, but at a very high cost, again raising the prospect of reform. Other pressures too exist for changing the priorities of resource allocation - for example, in order to speed up development of Siberia or to raise living standards. The cumulative effect of such pressures might be to weaken the position of the defense sector or to involve it more deeply in non-military functions. But it is not only the economic system that has been the focus of debate; there is also discussion about the Soviet Union's proper relationship to the rest of the world. Some have pressed for as great a degree of autarky and isolation as possible. Others have argued for a more outward-looking approach which would recognize that many global problems can be solved only by common and concerted action.[52] With the impending change of leadership, these various factors may lead to a turning-point in Soviet politics. The present leadership, as has been described, has given immense importance to military power. It is as yet unclear how the next generation, which will not have been marked so deeply by war, will view military power.

In pointing to these developments, one should not forget the militarizing pressures that were analyzed earlier in this paper. Nor should one suppose that a change of course undertaken by a Soviet leadership would amount to radical disarmament or demilitarization. But the possibility for some change does exist, and it should be the aim of the peace movement to try to

[52] For a discussion of the different trends see W. Clemens Jr *The USSR and Global Interdependence*, Washington D.C., 1978.

influence that change in the desired direction. There are considerable difficulties in influencing Soviet policy from the outside, for the political system is, both physically and culturally, impenetrable. It is hard to gain access to the policy-making process, and foreign attempts to influence policy will automatically be viewed with suspicion.

There are, nevertheless, two suggested courses to be pursued. The first of these is directed at Western governments. It aims at ensuring that they do not foreclose, through their own policies, on the possibility of Soviet moves toward disarmament and demilitarization. This course is a natural concomitant of efforts to press Western governments in that direction. But the Soviet dimension ought to be taken consciously into account. And so both the causes of Soviet militarism, and the ways in which pressure on Western governments can serve to influence the Soviet Union, must be analyzed. Such influence need not be directed solely at disarmament; it could draw the Soviet Union into cooperative efforts to solve such problems as the world food supply. Such efforts might later contribute to an atmosphere conducive to the working out of cooperative, non-military security arrangements.

The second course is directed at the Soviet Union. This suggests that Russian citizens engage in a dialogue about the problems of disarmament and demilitarization. The participants in such a dialogue should be as broadly representative of the population as possible and not merely confined to officials and dissidents. There is rich variety in the political views and currents in the Soviet Union, even allowing dissident and official views to overlap. There are, for example, strong nationalist tendencies in both official and dissident thinking, and dissident reformist views find an echo in official circles as well.[53]

The importance of this second course comes from the fact that there exists already, within Russia and without, vigorous debate about Russia's destiny and the proper path of Soviet development. But the issues of disarmament and demilitarization – which are critical to everyone's future – scarcely figure at all in these discussions. If these issues could be injected into the discussions, they would be subject to political thinking – and thinking, moreover, that is attuned to the specific problems and conditions of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, active debate and discussion about the problems of Soviet militarism might help to weaken the legitimation of the heavy burden it imposes.

It should not be supposed that everyone will welcome such discussion.

[53]See, for example, the discussion in R. Medvedev, *On Socialist Democracy*, London 1975, chs. 3 and 4.

In fact, the attempt to generate it may well be regarded as unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. But in this nuclear age, we are all affected by the military policies of the superpowers, and hence surely we have the right to try to influence them. There has been intense argument among Soviet dissidents as to whether internal forces or external forces will determine the possibility of greater democracy in the Soviet Union. The analysis in this paper suggests that internal forces will be more important both for general Soviet development and for Soviet military policy; but it suggests also that external conditions and influences have a definite bearing on the domestic choices.